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Iran’s overreliance on the Strait of Hormuz as a geopolitical weapon is proving self-destructive. By threatening or disrupting this critical chokepoint – through which roughly 20 million barrels per day (bpd) of oil historically flowed – Iran has accelerated the very diversification that will erode its leverage. Within a few years, every Persian Gulf nation will have an alternative to Hormuz in place, rendering Iran’s leverage over Hormuz essentially meaningless.
Several of these countries, long aware of the vulnerability, have already invested in pipelines and routes that bypass the strait, while others are currently exploring various options. Once fully operational and expanded, these alternatives will render Iran’s threats largely symbolic, stripping the Mullahs of their primary source of regional influence and economic coercion.
Saudi Arabia Best Positioned to Thrive Without Hormuz
Saudi Arabia leads this shift with its East-West Crude Oil Pipeline (Petroline), stretching approximately 1,200 km from Abqaiq in the east to Yanbu on the Red Sea. Built in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War and later expanded, it now operates at full capacity of around 7 million bpd. In recent crises, it has redirected massive volumes – roughly 5 million bpd for export after supplying domestic western refineries – allowing Saudi crude to reach global markets via the Red Sea without entering the Gulf. This infrastructure has proven resilient, with pumping stations quickly restored after disruptions, demonstrating its strategic value.
The UAE is also ahead of this game. Its existing Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP or Habshan-Fujairah) runs from inland fields to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, outside Hormuz, with a capacity of 1.5–1.8 million bpd. ADNOC is fast-tracking a parallel West-East pipeline, expected operational by 2027, to roughly double this capacity to around 3–3.6 million bpd. This expansion, accelerated amid recent tensions, underscores the UAE’s commitment to energy security and positions Fujairah as a major alternative hub.
Kuwait, heavily dependent on Gulf terminals, is pursuing collaborative options. It is discussing exports through Saudi and UAE pipelines and exploring broader ties with neighbors, including potential Mediterranean access via Iraq or revived routes. While not as advanced, these efforts reflect a regional trend toward interconnected infrastructure that reduces single-point vulnerabilities.
Iraq, another major producer, is reviving or proposing alternatives. Discussions include reactivating the long-dormant Iraqi Pipeline through Saudi Arabia (IPSA) to the Red Sea, though political and logistical hurdles remain. The Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast offers another outlet (capacity ~1.6 million bpd, though currently underutilized), and proposals like Basra-Aqaba (to Jordan’s Red Sea port) or extensions toward Syria and Turkey could further diversify routes. Iraq has already used overland trucking and Syrian corridors for fuel in emergencies.
Other initiatives include potential Oman connections, expanded use of Egypt’s SUMED pipeline (Suez-Mediterranean, ~2.8 million bpd capacity), and intra-Gulf cooperation. Iran itself has a limited Goreh-Jask pipeline (~0.3–1 million bpd effective) to the Gulf of Oman, but its own infrastructure lags and cannot offset the broader isolation it risks.
Collectively, these pipelines already provide several million bpd of bypass capacity, with expansions pushing toward 10+ million bpd in coming years. They cannot yet fully replace Hormuz volumes – tanker loading limits at Red Sea and Omani ports constrain throughput, and costs are higher – but they mitigate catastrophe and buy time for further investment. Saudi and UAE ramps during disruptions have kept significant exports flowing, stabilizing markets somewhat despite price spikes.
For Qatar, LNG Alternatives Are Limited
Qatar, the world’s second-leading LNG exporter, faces unique challenges due to its near-total reliance on tanker shipments through the Strait of Hormuz for global deliveries. Unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE with their crude oil pipelines, Qatar lacks dedicated overland bypass infrastructure for its massive LNG volumes. All major exports from Ras Laffan and other facilities must transit the strait by sea, making it highly vulnerable to disruptions.
In response, Qatar is exploring several alternatives. It already pipes modest volumes of natural gas regionally via the Dolphin pipeline to the UAE and Oman (with limited spare capacity). Discussions focus on expanding such ties, including potential extensions or new interconnections to Oman’s Gulf of Oman coastline for additional liquefaction capacity or export terminals outside Hormuz. Broader concepts include revived proposals for a Qatar-Turkey gas pipeline across the Arabian Peninsula (potentially integrated into regional “Four Seas” initiatives) to reach Mediterranean markets, and collaborative swap arrangements with Saudi and UAE exporters to fulfill contracts using their bypass routes. Conceptual ideas like a “Strait of Qatar” maritime corridor or overland/rail-supported rerouting are under consideration in GCC forums, though these remain aspirational and face high costs, technical hurdles, and political complexities.
A Frenzied Drive to Diversification
This frenzied drive to diversification exposes Iran’s strategic miscalculation. Threats to close the strait, once a potent deterrent, now incentivize Gulf states and consumers to accelerate alternatives, invest in redundancy, and reduce reliance on Iranian goodwill which everyone now sees is an illusion created by wishful thinking.
As routes mature, Iran’s ability to “hold the world hostage” evaporates. Its economy, already strained by sanctions and isolation, faces diminished relevance as a chokepoint power. Oil buyers will pivot to more reliable suppliers or diversified sources, while Gulf Arab states gain leverage through secure, overland exports.In essence, Iran is slitting its own geopolitical throat. Decades of brinkmanship have prompted the very infrastructure that neutralizes its strongest card.
Once these pipelines operate at scale, the Mullahs’ influence shrinks to rhetoric without teeth. The world market adapts, neighbors thrive independently, and Iran confronts the consequences of weaponizing a shared vulnerability it can no longer dominate. Long-term, this fosters greater regional energy resilience, albeit at higher infrastructure costs, underscoring a timeless lesson: coercive chokepoints invite their own obsolescence.
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